Introduction
pointed out that the basic Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model does not generate nearly enough volatility in unemployment and vacancies, for plausible parameter values. Hall (2005) argued that this problem can be fixed if the Nash bargaining component of the model is dropped: Hall assumed that wages are sticky in the sense that the wage level in a previous contract establishes a "social norm" that largely determines the wage in the next contract. In the absence of a theory of social norms, this solution effectively requires the introduction of a free parameter. The question in this paper is whether an extension of the Mortensen-Pissarides model to allow for informational rents can explain the volatility of unemployment in a more parsimonious way. A much more elaborate treatment of private information in this context is given by Menzio (2004) . Nágypál (2004) has shown that heterogeneity in workers' (private) evaluations of nonpecuniary job characteristics can substantially increase the volatility of unemployment.
A Model of Sticky Wages with Private Information and Aggregate Shocks
The model is a simplified version of the model analyzed in Kennan (2003) . A successful job match generates a surplus to be divided between the worker and the employer. The value of the worker's output is modeled as a binary random variable whose realization ("L" for low or "H" for high) is observed privately by the employer when the match is made. The probability of drawing a high surplus, p s , is a publicly observed Markov pure jump process with two states (s = 1 in the bad state and s = 2 in the good state), and exit hazards 8 1 and 8 2 . The probability of the high surplus is assumed to be higher in the good state.
2 Job and worker flows are modeled in the standard way, following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . When the joint continuation value from a match falls below the joint opportunity cost, the match is destroyed. The job destruction hazard rate is a constant, *, and there is a constant returns matching function that generates a flow of new matches M(N U ,N V ) from unemployment and vacancy stocks N U and N V . There is an 2 infinitely elastic supply of potential vacancies, and the actual number of vacancies posted is such that the expected profit from a vacancy is zero.
The match surplus is divided in the following way. Either the employer or the worker is randomly selected to make an offer, and if this offer is rejected the match dissolves. Clearly, the employer's offer will just match the worker's reservation level, which is the value of searching for another match. The worker effectively has two choices: an offer that exhausts the low surplus, with a sure acceptance, or an offer that exhausts the high surplus, with acceptance only if the high surplus has actually been realized. It is assumed that the parameters are such that the worker always finds it optimal to demand the low surplus. Brügemann and Moscarini (2005) show that the volatility of unemployment remains implausibly low for a broad class of surplus-sharing rules: the Nash Bargaining rule is not the source of the problem. On the other hand if there is some stickiness in wages, the employers' incentive to create vacancies is magnified when the economy improves, and this increases unemployment volatility, as Hall pointed out. Brügemann and Moscarini (2005) rule out wage stickiness by assuming that the division of the surplus should be invariant to a change in the location of the productivity distribution. This assumption is very appealing in the case of complete information. But when the employer has private information, it is optimal for workers to ignore small changes in the productivity distribution, and this gives rise to a kind of wage stickiness.
The match surplus depends on whether the employer draws a high or low value from the output distribution, and it also depends on the aggregate state. Let y s L and S s L be the flow surplus and the continuation value of the match when the output value is low, and the aggregate state is s, and similarly when the output value is high. For simplicity, it is assumed that the difference between the low and high output values does not depend on the aggregate state. That is,
Let U denote the state-dependent continuation value of an unmatched worker, and let G denote the joint continuation value of a matched worker-employer pair. In the low-output state, the joint continuation values are determined by the following asset pricing equations
This specification assumes that there is no possibility of switching from low to high output, once the match has been made, although the flow of output in a low-quality match is allowed to depend on the aggregate state variable. Even in the absence of informational rents, this would tend to increase unemployment volatility, by strengthening the incentive to create vacancies when the aggregate state is good. Brügemann (2005) analyzes the magnitude to this "vintage productivity" effect.
It is assumed that there is free entry of employers, so that the continuation value of an unmatched employer is zero in all states, so the (state-dependent) match surplus is the difference between the gross continuation value G and the joint continuation value of an unmatched worker, U. Thus where )U = U 2 -U 1 . This implies where 7 = 8 1 +8 2 . Substituting this in (2) gives 
( )
Similarly, for a high-output match, the surplus values are given by
The effect of the aggregate state on the match surplus is given by
Thus if an unmatched worker has better prospects when the aggregate state is good, the match surplus might be lower when the aggregate state is good, for a given output draw. On the other hand there is a higher probability of drawing a high output value in the good aggregate state.
The effect of the output draw on the match surplus is given by
The rate at which unemployed workers find new matches is M(N U ,N V )/N U = m(2), where 2 = N V /N U represents market tightness, and m(2) = M(1,2). The job-finding rate function m(2) is 
assumed to be strictly increasing, and concave. When a match is made, the worker is selected to make an offer with probability <. In this case, the worker gets the low-output surplus, and the employer gets an informational rent if the realized match value is high. If the employer is selected to make an offer, the worker gets the reservation level U and the employer gets the whole surplus. Thus an unmatched worker's continuation values are determined by the asset pricing equations where w 0 is the flow value of unemployment (including unemployment benefits and the value of leisure). Thus
Employers post new vacancies to the point where the net profit from doing so is zero. When a match is made, the employer gets an informational rent if the match value is high, and also gets a fraction 1-< of the low-output surplus (in expectation). Thus the zero-profit conditions implied by free entry are where c is the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy, and p s is the probability of drawing the high match value, for s = 1,2 .
It is convenient to let d = 2/m(2) denote the expected duration of a vacancy. 
Proof
The first and second derivatives of h are as follows Since x $ ", and H'(x) > 0, it is clear that h is decreasing. The function H(x)/x is increasing.
In fact if x 1 < x 2 then x 1 = (x 2 and H(x 1 ) # (H(x 2 ) + (1-()H(0) = (H(x 2 ), because H is convex and 
function of d 1 . Write this as d 2 = K 2 (d 1 ). Define the function >(x) = K 2 (x) -K 1 (x). Since R 1 (" 1 ,K 1 (" 1 )) = 0, and R 1 (" 1 ," 2 ) > 0, and R 1 is increasing in d 2 , it follows that K 1 (" 1 ) < " 2 .
Also, since R 2 (" 1 ,K 2 (" 1 )) = 0, and R 2 (" 1 ," 2 ) > 0, and R 2 is decreasing in d 2 , it follows that To show uniqueness, define the function g(z) = R(" + z). Then g 1 is increasing in z 2 and g 2 is increasing in z 1 , and both g 1 and g 2 are concave, and g(0) > 0. Therefore, by Theorem 1 in Kennan (2001) , g has at most one positive root, meaning that R has at most one root above ".
Since it has already been shown that R does have a root above ", and no roots anywhere else, the proof is complete.
Optimality of Pooling Offers
It is assumed that when a match is made in the good aggregate state, and the worker is selected to make an offer, it is optimal to demand the low surplus, rather than demand the high surplus at the risk of destroying the match. Thus the equilibrium surplus values must satisfy the following no-screening conditions which can be written as Theorem 1 characterizes a set of parameter values for which an equilibrium exists, and it shows that if the parameters lie in this set, the equilibrium is unique.
Unemployment Volatility
Since the model has just two aggregate states, the volatility of unemployment can be analyzed by comparing the steady-state levels of unemployment associated with each state (rather than measuring standard deviations in simulated data). Although this ignores movements along the transition paths from one steady state to the other, these transitions occur very rapidly, since the job-finding rate in the data is about 50% per month.
Standard parameter values are used as far as possible, following Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) . The interest rate is set at 5% per annum, and the job destruction rate * is set at .35 per annum, so that the month rate is about 3%. The flow value of nonemployment is set at 40% of the flow value of unemployment.
The simplest choice for the matching technology is a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas function, M = :U ( V 1-( , with m(2) = :2 1-( . In this case the equilibrium conditions can be stated as where N s = m(2 s ) is the job-finding rate, and where 4 Productivity could alternatively be measured as output per hour, and smaller smoothing parameters could also be justified. Since output per hour varies less than output per person, and smaller smoothing parameters (like the conventional choice of 1,600) attribute more of the variance to the trend component, these alternatives would give smaller volatility estimates. The point is that by any reasonable measure, labor productivity is not very volatile.
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Thus, as Shimer (2005) noted, the parameters c and : enter only through the ratio .
This ratio is set so that the average job-finding rate matches the data. The exit rate from unemployment is about 50% per month in the data, so : 0 is chosen to solve the equilibrium equations with N 1 8 2 + N 2 8 1 = 6 (8 2 + 8 1 ). The expected cost of filling a vacancy in state s is given by .
In the NBER postwar data, the average duration of a recession is about a year, and the average duration of an expansion is about 5 years. This implies that the exit hazards are 8 2 = 1/5 and 8 1 = 1. Shimer (2005) reports summary statistics for detrended labor productivity (output per person), using an HP filter with smoothing parameter 100,000: the standard deviation is .02 log points. Since the model in this paper assumes that productivity is a two-state process, it is perhaps better to measure volatility as the difference between the average levels of productivity during recessions and expansions. Using the same detrended productivity series, this difference is .028 log points. Letting Y 1 and Y 2 denote aggregate state-contingent productivity levels, this implies that Y 2 should be about 3% aboveY 1 , so Y 2 is set to 1.03, with Y 1 normalized at one. 4 The parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The steady-state unemployment levels are determined in the usual way as
In the case of a Cobb-Douglas matching function that is symmetric in unemployment and vacancies (( = ½), the equilibrium values of N 1 and N 2 for the parameters in Table 1 can be obtained from the following equations:
The solution is (N 1 = 4.295536223, N 2 =6.340892756, : 0 = 39.54966078).
In this example, " and " G are given by Since there is no informational rent in the bad state, the no-screening condition is irrelevant in that state. In the good state the no-screening condition holds if d 2 = N 2 /:² $ " G 2 . The equilibrium depends on p s only through the effect of p s on " s (provided that the no-screening condition holds), and with p 1 = 0, " 2 depends on p 2 only through the product p 2 )y, which is set to 0.03. The noscreening condition then holds provided that p 2 # 0.5605. Table 1 , but with y 1 L = 1, y 2 L = 1.03, and p 2 )y = 0. In this case, the unemployment rate is virtually constant. When the workers' outside opportunities are almost as good as their market production opportunities, it makes sense to reduce the number of vacancies. Moving workers into jobs raises the value of their output, but not by much, and in order to move workers into jobs, it is necessary to expend resources on vacancy costs. Reducing the number of vacancies economizes on the vacancy costs (because it reduces congestion); workers spend more time out of employment, but that is not very costly. Even if the value of the outside opportunity is the same as the value of production in the bad aggregate state, it still makes sense to move workers into jobs. This is because there may be a transition to the good aggregate state, and when that happens, employed workers are more productive than unemployed workers. If this transition is unlikely, the unemployment rate in the bad state will be high. But in the data, recessions are relatively shortlived, so although the Hagedorn and Manovskii calibration yields high unemployment rates, there
is not much difference between the level of unemployment in different states. 5 On the other hand, if the transition rates are reduced to 1% per annum, the Hagedorn and Manovskii calibration gives unemployment rates of 6.35% in the bad state, and 4.87% in the good state.
Discussion
If the matching function is symmetric in vacancies and unemployment (( = ½), and if there are no transitions (8 1 = 8 2 = 0), then the main equilibrium condition (16) reduces to (two copies of) the following equation:
where N is the job-finding rate, and
Figure 1
The effect of productivity fluctuations when there are no informational rents is illustrated in Figure 1 , which plots the quadratic function on the right side of equation (29) against the constant on the left side, with R set to zero. Productivity shocks move the horizontal line up and down in this figure, and the equilibrium job-finding rate adjusts along the quadratic curve. Since this curve is steep at the baseline equilibrium, small productivity shocks have little effect on the jobfinding rate.
Figure 2
The effect of informational rents is shown in Figure 2 . When R is positive, the quadratic curve shifts to the right, and a small informational rent gives a large increase in the equilibrium job-finding rate. On the other hand, the effect of productivity movements remains small, provided that these movements are publicly observed.
Conclusion
Rent is a powerful economic force, and private information is a pervasive rent source, so it is plausible that private information can help to explain features of the economy that are otherwise difficult to understand. It has been shown here that the introduction of private information in an otherwise standard model of unemployment fluctuations provides a reasonable explanation for the volatility of unemployment. In the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model, unemployment fluctuations are driven by labor productivity shocks. In the data, these shocks are small, and the implied fluctuations in unemployment are also small, and much smaller than the fluctuations in the data. But if the productivity realizations are privately observed by employers, the 20 implications for unemployment fluctuations are quite different. Small productivity shocks generate informational rents for employers, and small rents are a powerful job creation force.
Thus privately observed productivity shocks of the magnitude seen in the data can generate realistic unemployment fluctuations.
